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DIGNITY TAKINGS IN COMMUNIST POLAND: 




The end of World War II meant huge political changes in Poland. The 
country—whose population was decimated, whose elites were deliberately 
murdered, and whose government was exiled—became part of the Soviet 
Bloc. In other words, the country, crushed by the Nazi totalitarianism, be-
came part of a communist totalitarian system. It is not our goal here to ex-
plain the nature of both totalitarianisms; however, a short explanation of 
the communist version of “law-in-books v. law-in-action” dichotomy is 
needed.
In the communist doctrine, law was a tool of domination by the ruling 
class. That meant, among other things, that the judge or a party or govern-
ment official could disregard black letter law if she saw fit. It also meant 
that the government could use any rule against a citizen if the citizen was a 
“class enemy”—a person belonging to a social group considered dangerous 
for stability of the state.1 Since the communists claimed to have a winning 
formula for a perfect society, anyone who could prove otherwise was a 
potential threat. Other potential threats were people who could be leaders 
of opposition; in a supposedly perfect society, a person who wants to set 
things differently must be a natural enemy. However, class enemies have 
not always been persecuted or put on trial just for being enemies. Usually, 
there was a completely imaginary reason for persecution supported by false 
evidence. So one could be tried for anything from sabotage to espionage, 
but rarely for not approving communism. Sometimes, laws aimed at perse-
cution of certain social groups seemed neutral and legitimate. And often it 
was not the law on the books, but the way it was applied, that made perse-
cution possible. Thus, a lawyer or legal historian working with legal docu-
* Assistant Professor, Opole University Faculty of Law and Administration.
** Professor extraordinarius and Dean of Laws, Opole University Faculty of Law and Administration
1. Krystyna Trembicka, Kategoria Wroga Klasowego w Komunistycznej Polsce w Latach 1956–
89, 21 ANNALES UMCS LUBLIN-POLONIA 105, 109 (2014).
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ments of this era must be aware that what he reads is not always what really 
happened.
The concept of dignity takings developed by Bernadette Atuahene can 
be used to explain part of what happened in Poland during the Communist 
era. The idea of illegal or unconstitutional takings is something with which 
lawyers in Europe are more than familiar. Throughout the twentieth centu-
ry, many European countries had authoritarian governments, and many 
were occupied by what we refer today as “rogue nations.” Illegal takings 
were only a part of this period of history. Continental lawyers dealing with 
the aftermath of illegal takings focus mostly on the technical and procedur-
al methods of returning illegally seized property.2 The value of Professor 
Atuahene’s method of analyzing and defining illegal takings is adding the 
dignity component to this debate. Dignity takings are defined as situations 
“when a state directly or indirectly destroys property or confiscates various 
property rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or uninten-
tional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.”3
In this paper, we would like to focus on two forms of dignity takings 
under communism in Poland: military service of “class enemies,” and col-
lectivization, i.e., forcing farmers and landowners to surrender their proper-
ty to the state. Both forms of takings have led to treating “class enemies” as 
second-class citizens; the latter case also unintentionally led to infantiliza-
tion of workers in state-owned and cooperative farms.
“Class enemy” is a term used in communist newspeak.4 It corresponds 
well with the notion of the “objective enemy” introduced by Hannah Ar-
endt.5 An objective enemy can be defined as a person or group of persons 
(including but not limited to social classes, as well as ethnic and religious 
communities) declared by the state as the ultimate enemy of the govern-
ment and social order. The criteria for labelling someone as an objective 
2. Cf. e.g., Piotr Stec, Reprivatisation of Nationalised Property in Poland, in 1 MODERN 
STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 357 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2002); LIVIU DAMSA, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
PROPERTY REGIMES AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A 
THEORY (2017); DARIUSZ WALENCIK, REWINDYKACJA NI K KATOLICKIEGO W 
P K M (2008); DARIUSZ WALENCIK, N
K KATOLICKIEGO W POLSCE W LATACH 1918–2012: REGULACJE PRAWNE-NACJONALIZACJA-
REWINDYKACJA (2013). 
3. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016); see also Bernadette Atua-
hene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Under-
standing Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796 (2016);
BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND 
RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014).
4. See Krystyna Trembicka, Walka z Wrogiem—Cecha Konstytutywna 
Politycznej, 19 HUM. & SOC. SCI. 169, 173 (2014).
5. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt 1994) (1951).
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enemy are arbitrary, yet may be disguised as politically or scientifically 
rational. Objective enemies are stigmatized as sub-humans or non-humans, 
which justifies their annihilation.6
A non-exhaustive list of potential class enemies of the communist 
state includes entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, rich farmers, priests, people 
receiving their degrees before communists took over, people receiving their 
degrees abroad, and even communists who did not notice that an ideologi-
cal line of the communist party had changed.7
It should also be noted that the notion of a “second-class citizen” can 
sometimes be misleading. In contemporary Polish, strongly influenced by 
the totalitarian experience of Poles, “obywatel drugiej kategorii” means not 
only a person of lower social status, but also (mainly nowadays) a person 
who was marginalized and made a social outcast, deprived of dignity, free-
dom, property, and sometimes life. We should also remember that, in the 
period covered by this paper, Poland was either under direct Soviet rule 
(until 1956), or ruled by Soviet-trained apparatchiks.8 The country lost six 
million of its citizens during WWII, including practically all Jewish and 
Roma populations.9 With a decimated population and an infrastructure 
largely destroyed by war, Poland was not able to resist Soviet-imposed 
rules. This helps explain the relatively low level of resistance against prop-
erty takings.
We adopt a top-down approach to show how the idea that some peo-
ple—because of their social background or moral convictions—were not 
considered worthy enough to survive in the Brave New World of real so-
cialism that was transformed into a formally valid but immoral law and 
policy.
6. Tomasz Scheffler, Przest pstwo Publicznego Propagowania Faszystowskiego lub Innego 
Totalitarnego Ustroju Pa stwa (art. 256 k.k.). Analiza Doktrynologiczna Wybranych Wypowiedzi 
Pi miennictwa I Judykatury. Cz Ogólna, 34 STUDIA NAD AUTORYTARYZMEM I TOTALITARYZMEM
97, 101–02 (2012).
7. We include a statutory (and incomplete) list of class enemies drafted as slave soldiers later in 
this paper.
8. For an account of current state of the debate on status of communist Poland as a Soviet Un-
ion-dependent state, see Andrzej Friszke, Spór o PRL w III Rzeczypospolitej, 1 P I
S 9, 13–14 (2002).
9. There is an ongoing research project aimed at identifying all Polish WWII victims. Currently 
the database contains names of over 5 million identified victims. To access the database, see Baza 
Danych, STRATY OSOBOWE I OFIARY REPRESJI POD ,
http://www.straty.pl/index.php/baza-programu [https://perma.cc/SRC6-JE8K ].
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II. SLAVE SOLDIERS BETWEEN EXTERMINATION AND BRAINWASHING
The story of slave soldiers is not a long one, but it is a bloody one. As 
a result of post-war political changes, Poland signed a treaty with the Sovi-
et Union regarding reparations.10 A part of this agreement was Poland’s 
obligation to supply the Soviet Union with coal.11 Poland was a country 
that lost more than twenty percent of its population after the war, and the 
country was literally in ruins.12 As a result, Poland had a limited labor 
force. Initially, the communists decided to reach for German POWs and use 
them for slave labor. According to various accounts, they were either pris-
oners from Eastern provinces of Germany attached to Poland after WWII, 
or POWs imported from the Soviet Union.
Since the Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva and Hague conven-
tions on rules of war, the Soviets were not obliged to treat German prison-
ers in a humanitarian way.13 The Soviets had no moral obstacles against 
exploiting them for slave labor or trading them in exchange for coal.14 The
Polish government, almost completely under Russian control,15 could not 
do much about it. Having considered the magnitude of German atrocities in 
Poland, there was not much sympathy for the devil on the Polish side, so 
German facilities for Polish- and Jewish-forced labor were used this time to 
host German POWs working in the mines.16 This period, however, was 
relatively short, and German POWs soon returned to Germany. But be-
10. Jan Sandorski, 
Roszczenia Odszkodowawcze, 66 RUCH PRAWNICZY, EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICZNY 53, 58–70 
(2004). 
11. , in TAJEMNICE CZARNYCH BARONÓW. -GÓRNICY 
1949–1959, at 208–09 (2013). See generally J Z , BATALIONY ROBOCZE-
BUDOWLANE W LUDOWYM WOJSKU POLSKIM: DOKUMENTY-FAKTY-WSPOMNIENIA (2001); Dariusz 
Burczyk, – –59), 1 P I
S 269 (2012); Edward J. Nalepa, Wojskowe Bataliony Górnicze w Polsce w Latach 
1949–1959, 85 P HISTORYCZNY 123, 124 (1994).
12. The exact numbers are hard to establish. The estimates vary from 600,000 to more than 6 
million victims, depending on counting methodology (some scholars count Nazi victims only, some 
include people killed and/or deported by the Soviets). The most recent accounts estimate the global 
number of victims at 6.8 million. Cf. POLSKA 1939–1945: STRATY OSOBOWE I OFIARY REPRESJI POD 
DWIEMA OKUPACJAMI (Tomasza Szaroty & Wojciech Materskiego eds., 2009). 
13. This went both ways, since Germans mistreated Soviet POWs as militants not protected by 
the rules of war.
14. It should also be noted that Soviets conducted real slave hunts in the Southern part of con-
temporary Poland, kidnapping and deporting to Russia miners and skilled workers, both Poles, Germans 
and people of mixed ancestry. See generally ,
35 Z 51 (2008).
15. E.g., some members of the government and the army, including the Commander in Chief, 
were so called “acting Poles” ( )—Soviet military and apparatchiks allegedly 
with Polish roots sent to Poland as colonial officers.
16. Nalepa, supra note 11, at 124.
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cause Poland was still obliged to pay reparations in coal, the labor gap had 
to be filled somehow.
One of the obvious solutions was to employ soldiers. Since there were 
no volunteers, the government decided to draft recruits and form miner and 
construction battalions (also called substitute military service units).17
These units were based on the Soviet model of stroibatalion, which was 
basically the military version of Gulag. This model was adopted in the 
entire Eastern Bloc, and was probably part of a concerted action because 
stroibatalions in various Central and Eastern European (“CEE”) countries 
were consecutively numbered.18
The question this paper explores is whether mining and construction 
battalions were dignity takings. Given that we are dealing with a system 
where official policy and real policy were often completely different, this is 
not an easy answer.
Prima facie, the battalions were a normal part of military service. Even 
in modernity, many armies feature specialist units focusing on engineering 
or logistic support for the field units.19 It is not unusual for an army to help 
with the harvest, or to provide help during emergencies or natural disasters. 
Many legal systems also have substitute military service for people who, 
for religious or moral reasons, do not want to serve in the army.20
Throughout debates over the law on compensation and retirement benefits 
for victims of communist persecution, army lawyers argued that mining 
and construction battalions were simply auxiliary engineering units not 
connected with the communist system of political repression.21 This was 
not the case for several reasons.
First, engineering units are specialist forces composed usually of high-
ly skilled soldiers with appropriate training.22 Polish mining and construc-
tion battalions were composed of people with mixed qualifications—many 
of them without job-specific skills—and the army provided new recruits 
with no particular engineering training.23 Second, recruits for these battal-
ions were selected according to “class enemy” criterion, and were consid-
17. Id.; Kieszek, supra note 11, at 209. 
18. KAZIMIERZ BOSEK, TAJEMNICE CZARNYCH BARONÓW -GÓRNICY 1949–1959, at 
84 (2013).
19. Military Engineering, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/military-engineering [http://perma.cc/D9QX-VTET].
20. Cf. e.g., Marcin Mróz, 
, Hiszpania), 92 RAPORT 1 (1996). 
21. Z , supra note 11, at 28.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Nalepa, supra note 11, at 132.
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ered second-class citizens not worthy of undergoing normal military train-
ing or obtaining standard uniforms.
The legal (or perhaps illegal) ground for creating mining and construc-
tion military units was a secret order from the Commander-in-Chief, 
Marchal Konstanty Rokossowski.24 According to this order, the following 
types of recruits (class enemies) were conscripted into mining and con-
struction battalions:
sons of rich farmers, expropriated landowners, merchants, businesspeople 
employing laborers, owners of larger houses in the cities, and “members 
of pre-September repression apparatus” (i.e., Polish pre-war government, 
police, military, judiciary, etc.);
recruits who, according to assessments by political police, have a “hostile 
attitude towards present reality”;
persons whose family members were convicted in Communist Poland 
(literally “People’s Poland”) for political crimes;
recruits who have contacts with close relatives living abroad in capitalist 
countries who have hostile attitudes towards Communist Poland; and
persons convicted for political crimes against Communist Poland.
This order specifically excluded members of the communist party 
from service in construction and mining battalions.
Specific problems arose with recruiting people from regions of Poland 
that were part of Germany before 1945 and that were assigned to Poland 
after the Potsdam Agreement, or that were in parts of Poland considered by 
the Nazis to be land populated by people of German descent.25 These were 
border regions with strong connections to Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Austria, and Germany.26 Many of the inhabitants were classed as ethnic 
Germans and forced to sign the German Nationality List (Die Volksliste)
and to serve in the German army.27 Signing the Volksliste was considered 
high treason except in the above-mentioned regions, where declaring Ger-
man nationality was not a voluntary act.28 The above-mentioned order ad-
ditionally distinguished between signatories with proletarian and “class 
enemy” backgrounds.29 For recruiters, these subtle juridical differences 
must have been undistinguishable, since even contemporary historians 
24. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 24–26.
25. See supra note 14, at 51–52.
26. For a detailed account of the region’s complicated history, see generally KAZIMIERZ 
P , HISTORIA (1984).
27. Nalepa, supra note 11, at 125.
28. See generally ZYGMUNT IZDEBSKI, NIEMIECKA LISTA NARODOWA NA GÓRNYM ,
KATOWICE (1946).
29. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 25.
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wonder how a person with a German name and surname could sincerely 
declare Polish nationality.30 Many Poles living in border regions had Ger-
man first names and surnames, and many Germans were of Polish de-
scent,31 although the general public is not always aware of this fact.
Soldiers of the construction and mining battalions formed three dis-
tinct groups. The first group were uranium miners—slave soldiers digging 
uranium for the Soviet atomic bomb project. We have limited knowledge 
of their service. What we know is that they worked with no safety protec-
tions and were basically unskilled miners. Due to exposure to radiation and 
harsh working conditions, out of the 3,000 military uranium miners, only a 
handful were alive in 1989 when they could safely tell their story.32 The 
second group were coal miners, and the third were construction workers. 
These two groups had much higher survival rates, and their working condi-
tions were different. Being sent to a construction battalion was a milder 
sentence because construction workers had more personal freedom and had 
readier contact with the civilian population. According to accounts of the 
soldiers, civilians were generally sympathetic towards them.33 On the other 
hand, miners were more insulated from the external world, and—due to the 
character of their work—had only limited contact with civilian workers.
Miner soldiers had no military or vocational training. What they recall 
are hours of mindless military drills with wooden carbines, or exercises 
with sticks.34 There was a common conviction among the recruits: the drills 
were intended to either make them too busy to think, or to break their spir-
its. It had nothing to do with what one would expect from military training. 
Also, there was no practical or technical training connected with recruits’ 
future work.
Working conditions were harsh, if not inhumane. Members of mining 
and construction military units were considered second-class people. They 
received low quality uniforms and sackcloth belts,35 so it was easy to dis-
tinguish between them and “real” soldiers. There are reports of miner-
30. Burczyk, supra note 11, at 256. This particular soldier was Erich Koch, son of Reinhard Koch 
31. A good example of these complicated relationships is the fact that during WWII, Nazi general 
32. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 32.
33. During WWII, many Polish citizens had been deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan in the 
USSR, and a large portion of Poland was under direct Soviet rule from 1939 until 1942.
34. Cf. Z , supra note 11, at 49–50.
35. Many soldiers recall that they got sackcloth belts, not leather ones like other soldiers, which 
they found humiliating and stigmatising. It was sort of like being branded with a sign saying “lower 
caste.” BOSEK, supra note 18, at 110.
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soldiers with no access to decent clothing or clean underwear, and with 
limited access to baths.36 Coal mining is a dirty job; under normal circum-
stances, miners end their shift in a bath. One of the miner-soldiers recalls 
that while on one of the rare leaves, he went dancing, and people showed 
him sympathy because they noticed coal dust tattooed into the bags under 
his eyes.37
Untrained soldiers worked in the most dangerous parts of the mines 
where mortality and accident rates were very high.38 Soldiers working in 
uranium mines were additionally exposed to radiation and had to drink 
contaminated water.39 The fact that military doctors tended to cure every-
thing from flu to pneumonia—and even broken ribs—with aspirin, and to 
treat soldiers as malingerers added to this count.40 One of the soldiers of a 
construction battalion recalls that when he broke his toe, he received no 
sick leave and had to go to the construction site with only one shoe on his 
foot; in order to be able to walk, he had improvised a sandal out of a wood-
en box for his injured foot.41
The soldiers were theoretically paid for their work, but unlike normal 
soldiers in military service, they had to pay for their food, lodging, and 
clothing—paying the army for what the army should have provided them.42
They were undernourished, and the rations were often inedible,43 but sol-
diers had no possibility of buying themselves decent food.44 One of the 
soldiers reported that he had to come back home in an old uniform because 
his civilian garments were lost somewhere by the administration, and his 
salary was not enough to buy new clothes.45
Another group of class enemies affected by communist policies were 
clerics. Traditionally, priests-in-training and other college students had 
been exempted from the draft, and had undergone reserve officer corps 
training in college.46 This rule ceased to exist in the early 1950s when the 
government decided to deny theological seminaries college status and to 
36. Miner soldiers in one of the mines had their working clothes unwashed for three months, and 
their underwear was “as dirty and black as soil.” Z , supra note 11, at 65.
37. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 110.
38. Id. at 46.
39. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 224; Nalepa, supra note 11, at 131–32.
40. Z , supra note 11, at 64.
41. Id. at 62.
42. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 227.
43. Z , supra note 11, at 70. 
44. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 226.
45. Z , supra note 11, at 63.
46.
Batalionu Ratownictwa Terenowego w Bartoszycach), 18 KLIO 103, 103–04 (2011).
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draft clerics.47 Initially, priests-in-training served with other soldiers. How-
ever, the army noticed that they had an unwelcome influence on other sol-
diers. Priests were officially “class enemies,” but they usually managed to 
win the respect and sympathy of other soldiers by selfless behavior, sharing 
food supplies, and supporting bullied colleagues.48
The experiment of mixing clerics with criminals serving in penal mili-
tary units (Shtrafbats) also failed for similar reasons. The clerics did not fit 
into the propaganda-inspired picture of a greedy, selfish priest preying on 
his naïve, innocent flock. So, the army created companies of priests-in-
training coming from different parts of the country.49 These companies 
served two different purposes. First, to separate clerics form other soldiers 
in order to limit their moral and spiritual influence, and also to facilitate 
untrue rumors such as priest-soldiers getting special stipends that they 
spend on “luxuries” (coffee, wine, and vodka), and living a life unbecom-
ing of Catholic priests.50 The second purpose was to create an environment 
suitable for brainwashing, and to subject clerics to psychical and mental 
torment.51 Unlike miner-soldiers and construction soldiers, priests had not 
been deprived of wages or property. This system was intended to deprive 
them of their dignity, making their lives miserable, and forcing the clerics 
to renounce their beliefs. Thus, it was not about physical deterioration of 
class enemies, but about breaking their spirits.
Like miner-soldiers, priest-soldiers were not real soldiers. The priest 
battalions were auxiliary units, responsible technically for territorial de-
fense.52 Only technically because no one has ever dreamed of training these 
people how to be soldiers or even military chaplains.53 We know, however, 
that they were used as a support in case of natural disasters, and sometimes 
to assist during the harvest.54 Surprisingly, this was the only part of the 
47. Id.
48. Id. , 6 CZASY N 320, 
327 (1999), http://www.czasy-nowozytne.pl/Czasy_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/S35C-WD9P].
49.
—Studium Historyczno-prawne, 108 ZESZYTY NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU 
PRZYRODNICZO-HUMANISTYCZNEGO W SIEDLCACH SERIA: ADMINISTRACJA I Z 31, 45 
(2016).
50. Tadeusz Fitych, , NONPOSSUMUS,
http://www.nonpossumus.pl/biblioteka/tadeusz_fitych/artykuly/swa.php [https://perma.cc/Z6BX-
CT2U].
51. Id. , supra note 48, at 331; supra note 46, at 111.
52. supra note 46, at 106–07.
53. Id. , supra note 48, at 331.
54. supra note 46, at 119.
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clerics military service that was really connected with what one might con-
sider military service.55
As aforementioned, priest-soldiers were supposed to be brainwashed 
and convinced to renounce their faith or to quit the theological seminary 
and start lay life. This process was a multi-level operation that included 
both intellectual and physical denigration. Military personnel of cleric 
companies were composed of officers and non-commissioned officers se-
lected for their aversion towards the clergy.56 Recruits were under constant 
surveillance by undercover agents of the military’s “information service” 
(i.e., political police) posing as recruits.57 On a psychological level, priest-
soldiers were constantly confronted with communist anti-church propagan-
da, compulsory meetings with ex-priests, promises of college scholarships, 
and guaranteed careers for those who drop out of the seminary. Although 
there was no direct prohibition of religious practices, the priest-soldiers’ 
daily routine was designed in a way that made it impossible to attend the 
Holy Mass on Sundays, with clerics taking part in compulsory “educational 
activities” like Sunday excursions.58 Priest-soldiers were also encouraged 
to become better acquainted with women during Sunday dance evenings, 
which were also compulsory.59 Priests-in-training who organized or took 
part in various forms of religious activity were subject of disciplinary ac-
tions, usually not for practicing religion, but for denial to comply with an 
order either not to engage in prayer or to cease prayer.
As a pars pro toto, we will use the life story of one priest, Rev. Jerzy
preached non-violent resistance against communists and who was subse-
quently murdered by the political police.60 As a young cleric-soldier, he 
was imprisoned for refusing to throw away his rosary. He was forced to 
55. , 13 GRUDNIA,
http://13grudnia.org.pl/artykuly/odebrany-r%C3%B3%C5%BCaniec [https://perma.cc/MU63-RR2C].
56. , supra note 48, at 329–30.
57.
Opole University, told us that during his military service, he learned not to take notes or write anything 
down, because everything they left in writing could have been used against them or against people 
whose names they carelessly wrote down.*
58. Krawczyk, supra note 49, at 45–46.
59. At that time, canon law forbade priests and clerics from dancing, as an activity unbecoming of 
priests. These rules date back to the Middle Ages. See, e.g., Sylwia Konarska–Zimnicka, 
, 18 LITURGIA 
SACRA 85 (2012). The latest act dealing with priest participation in dances issued by the Congregation 
for the Sacraments and Divine Worship states that even in the case of religious dance “the priests must 
always be excluded from the dance.” Dance in the Liturgy, EWTN, 
www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/CDWDANCE.HTM [https://perma.cc/FX22-X7M8].
60. See generally MILENA KINDZIUK, WIADEK PRAWDY: KS. JERZEGO 
P (2004).
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exercise for hours with his gas mask on, and one of the officers tormented 
him during something he called “swimming lessons.” The young priest was 
made to wear a rope tangled around his waist while the officer responsible 
for this “training” would throw him into the pool. The officer would wait 
until the young man started to drown, and would then pull him out and 
throw him into the pool again. Another torment was forcing priest-recruits 
to exercise or to scrub floors and toilets while wearing gas masks.61
rected to the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army that the govern-
ment’s main purpose of young priests’ military training was not to turn 
them into soldiers or army chaplains, but rather to discriminate against the 
priests’ religion.62 Whenever the army succeeded, young soldiers who 
dropped out of seminaries had their spirits broken and felt they had be-
trayed their calling. Both these priests and those who remained true to their 
calling were victims of religious persecution.
The main purpose of this military training was to take away young 
priests’ dignity and to denigrate them for their religious convictions, turn-
ing them into second-class citizens. But did this involve treating them as 
less than human or like children? In a way—yes. The official view was 
that, if you were a religious person, especially a priest in training, you must 
have been deluded by the priests using religion as “opium for [the] mass-
es.”63
For communists, religion was only a tool of social control, and official 
propaganda tried to expose the Roman Catholic Church64 as a bunch of 
crooks cheating the flock with false miracles.65 So anyone willing to be-
come a priest must have been either a crook or a deluded child. Thus, it was 
natural for a communist state to take care of such a person and turn him 
into a model follower of the winning formula. Yet, throughout this “con-
version,” priests were second-class citizens, treated as animals, dehuman-
ized, and ostracized.
61. , PARAFIA BYSTRZYCA (May 26, 2010), 
http://parafiabystrzyca.pl/artykuly/ad015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B26- supra note 55. Just 
by pure coincidence, Rev. —he was drowned in the river by members 
of the communist political police. Id.
62. , supra note 48, at 330.
63. As to the metaphor of religion as an opium, see generally Andrew M. McKinnon, 
Reading ‘Opium of the People’: Expression, Protest and the Dialectics of Religion, 31 CRITICAL SOC.
15 (2005).
64. Other churches were of minor significance in Poland and it was easier to break them, given 
their local nature.
65. From our childhood days, we remember popular science books about fake miracles and 
ingenious ways the Church preys on its flocks. 
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III. COLLECTIVIZATION, OR WE WANT WHAT IS YOURS
Communist policy towards private ownership of land was a good ex-
ample of the discrepancy between political declarations and real political 
intent (much like the discrepancy between the law on the books and the law 
in action in communist Poland).
The process of nationalization of agricultural real property started 
formally as a continuation of pre-war land use reforms with a decree on 
land reform.66 According to this decree, the state nationalized large farms 
and later distributed plots of land to small farmers and so-called no-land 
farmers ( ) because the communist vision of land ownership 
did not include independent farmers. According to the 1948 Bucharest 
resolution of the Komintern, all Soviet Bloc countries had to adopt the 
Soviet model advocating a state monopoly of land ownership.67 The decree 
on land reform was a prelude to nationalization and collectivization (i.e., 
creation of state-controlled agricultural cooperatives). Expropriated land 
owners received no compensation for their property, and were forced to 
settle far away from their land.68 This rule was aimed at impoverishing 
former land owners and destroying the social bonds of local communities. 
These individuals were persecuted even after expropriation, as they were 
stigmatized fir being a bezet (i.e., former landowner) and were left with 
very limited possibility for gainful employment. Their children could be 
easily expelled from schools, and were often banned from access to higher 
education.69
The situation that land reform beneficiaries faced was also far from 
perfect. They usually had no money, tools, or other resources required to 
run a farm, and they often had no experience in agribusiness. Moreover, all 
private farmers were obliged to deliver crops and other agricultural prod-
ucts to the state. The number of deliveries was usually set at an unattaina-
ble level, and the law provided severe penalties for farmers failing to 
deliver the state-specified quantity. In the case of settlers in Poland’s West-
ern provinces, additional burdens plagued the land they received from col-
66.
adzeniu Reform Rolnej, POLISH COMM. OF NAT’L LIBERATION (Sept. 6, 1944), 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19440040017 [https://perma.cc/V4UR-XL9U].
67. –
, 19 STUDIA IURIDICA LUBLINENSIA 245, 246 (2013).
68. Stec, supra note 2, at 361.
69. , BIULETYN 
INSTYTUTU P NARODOWEJ, Jan. 12, 2002, at 52.
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lectivization.70 Some of these settlers received land as compensation for 
land they had in former Eastern provinces of Poland annexed by the Soviet 
Union in 1939.71 It should be noted that private “ownership” of agricultural 
property of that era was not ownership in a classical, Roman meaning of 
the word. The land law was devised so that formal owners lost real control 
of their property and were in no better position than the hired workforce. 
The settlers in the Western provinces had their plots assigned on the basis 
of an administrative decision, often without the possibility of registering 
their title in a Grundbuch (court-run land registry).72 Having taken into 
account German claims to Western provinces of Poland,73 they also had the 
fear of having to leave their new homes.74
The Central Committee of the PPR (Polish Communist Party) started 
the collectivization process in 1948 following the Bucharest resolution. The 
Party had determined the number of cooperatives to be created and de-
stroyed in their internal constitutions. The cooperatives were thus com-
pletely state-controlled, and were deprived of any characteristics of 
independence like those found in private business associations. Their struc-
ture was based on the Soviet concept of kolkhoz (collective farm) rather 
than European co-ops, although the name kolkhoz was not used officially. 
Farmers joining the cooperative lost control of their land, and were unable 
to control it, even as members of the association. In the land law theory of 
that era, even the right of a cooperative to own land was disputed. Some 
authors argued that the plots in possession of a co-op were de facto state 
property, and the co-op could use it as usufructland. Another theory was 
that these plots constituted a weaker form of state property called “social 
property.”75
Given these facts, farmers were reluctant to join collective farms, so 
the communist party started a large campaign to convince the farmers to 
70. Wojciech Zientara, 
—I Powojennym, 102 ROCZNIKI NAUKOWE EKONOMII ROLNICTWA I ROZWOJU 
OBSZARÓW WIEJSKICH 6, 41–42 (2015).
71.
, POLISH MINISTRY OF PUB. ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 1944), 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19460490279 [https://perma.cc/6X8Q-SLGF].
72. See generally Anita Kwartnik– –Uberman, Dokumenty Nadania 
, 1 GEOMATICS & ENVTL. ENGINEERING 149 
(2007).
73. Western provinces of Poland were former Eastern provinces of Germany assigned to Poland 
by the Potsdam Treaty in exchange for the land annexed by the Soviet Union.
74. See generally C O , S POLSKI ZACHODNIEJ I P
LATACH 1945–1956: PROCESY INTEGRACJI I DEZINTEGRACJI (1994).
75. For a detailed discussion of these two theories, see JAN WASILKOWSKI, P
PRL. Z 54 (1969).
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join, willingly or not.76 This was a concerted action of political police, civic 
militia (police core), and party propagandists. Since collectivization was a 
part of communists’ winning formula, only “class enemies” would deny its 
benefits. These enemies were usually rich farmers (kulaks) who owned at 
least fifteen-hectare farms. Smaller farmers were tolerated, although looked 
at with suspicion. Private property was dangerous, and farmers were natu-
ral carriers of the “capitalist venom.”77
During the collectivization, kulaks were mostly affected. Presented as 
enemies of small-scale farmers, they were a natural target for “de-
kulakisation,” which simply forced rich farmers to surrender their property 
to the state. Kulaks who failed to supply the required portion of crops were 
either forced to kneel for hours in the communal party center—with “ene-
my of the people” or “Kulak” written on their foreheads—or forced to wear 
labels with similar names. Beatings and other forms of harassment were 
also popular. Later, the party used more subtle ways of tormenting rich 
farmers, like excessive taxation, impossible delivery goals, paying for farm 
goods well below production costs, and limiting access to bank credits.78 A
peculiar form of chicanery was compulsory help—volunteers from an or-
ganization called “Serve Poland” came to rich farmers to “help” them with 
the harvest. Once the group finished, the farmers were subsequently billed 
for this unwanted help.79
Kulaks were often arrested or fined for imaginary crimes. Those ar-
rested were kept in inhumane conditions and put on pokazukha trials,
which were witnessed by people brought in specifically to see what crimi-
nals rich farmers were. In many cases, farmers were additionally subjected 
to threats that members of their families would lose jobs, or that children 
would be expelled from schools or denied access to college educations. 
These humiliating procedures of “indirect nationalization”80 were quite 
successful—many farmers surrendered their land to the state so their fami-
lies would at least have a chance to survive.81
76. Dariusz Jarosz & Grzegorz Miernik, Kobiety w Buncie Antykolektywizacyjnym w Okole w 
1953 R. Wybrane konteksty interpretacyjne, 14 POLSKA 1944/45–1989. STUDIA I M 29, 31
(2016). 
77. Tadeusz Chrobak, – , in N
PUBLICZNYM 173 (2015).
78. Tomasz Rochatka & Barbara Rochatka, Kolektywizacja w Polsce w Latach 1945–1956,
BIULETYN INSTYTUTU P NARODOWEJ, Jan. 12, 2002, at 35–37.
79. , BIULETYN 
INSTYTUTU P NARODOWEJ, Jan. 12, 2002, at 32. 
80. A term coined by professor Andrzej Stelmachowski.*
81. Jankowiak, supra note 79, at 30, 33; Rochatka & Rochatka, supra note 79, at 34–36.
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There were also softer methods of collectivization. For instance, prop-
aganda measures included attempts to explain to farmers the economic 
benefits of joining a cooperative, indoctrinations in schools, promises of 
priority for entry of co-op members’ kids to kindergartens and nurseries, 
tax benefits, and higher wages. Harvesting help from “Serve Poland,” 
school children, and the army was also promised.82 These practices both 
dehumanized and infantilized independent farmers.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE AND RESTITUTION
Miner-soldier and construction battalion conscripts had little if any 
opportunity for self-defense or dignity-protection. We know from the rela-
tions of soldiers working in the construction battalions that at least some of 
them used something we could call “The River Kwai self-defense.” Both in 
Pierre Boulle’s novel The Bridge over the River Kwai83 and in the famous 
movie,84 British POWs tried to survive the harsh conditions of a Japanese 
camp by maintaining military etiquette and professional integrity. As one 
of the soldiers working as a construction worker recalled, “[t]hey did all 
they could to have their hair well groomed, parade uniforms cleaner and 
trousers well-ironed so they would look better than real soldiers.”85 Many
soldiers recall that the civilian population was sympathetic toward them, 
even though they were depicted by the government as dangerous, criminal 
elements.86 This was especially true for the areas where people had previ-
ous experience with the Soviets and were aware of how the system 
worked.87
What was true for construction battalions was not necessarily true for 
miner-soldiers. The miner-soldiers’ work had been much harder and more 
dangerous. They worked underground, with limited, if any, contact with 
civilian populations.88 We have little information so far about the way ci-
vilian miners perceived miner-soldiers. It was easier to separate forced 
laborers from the rest of the labor force, so we can only guess. Many min-
er-soldiers were untrained and inexperienced, and posed a threat not only to 
82. Gerard Czaja, Kolektywizacja Rolnictwa w Powiecie Bytowskim, in P
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKI 23–36 (2010), http://przegladzachodniopomorski.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/PZ_2010_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/93KS-T9XA].
83. See generally PIERRE BOULLE, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER KWAI (1954).
84. THE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (Columbia Pictures 1957).
85. Z , supra note 11, at 59–60. 
86. Id. at 74.
87. Id. at 62 (collection of memories of construction soldiers).
88. According to Kazimierz Bosek miner soldiers were stationed in former prisoner of war 
camps. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 75, 80.
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themselves, but also to their companions. In the close-knit communities of 
miners in the Upper Silesia region, there is a very strong sense of camara-
derie based on mutual trust between professionals. Unexperienced new-
comers are usually perceived as a physical threat.89 On the other hand, 
some miner-soldiers were professionals, able at least to try to ensure mini-
mum safety of the team.90
The situation of priests-in-training was completely different, giving 
them many ways of employing dignity-restoring self-defense. In the early 
period, when young clerics were mixed with other soldiers, they naturally 
took the role of spiritual leaders, helping their colleagues by comforting 
them, sharing food, etc.91 Consequently, a handful of priests could under-
mine the ideological training of young recruits and serve as a source of 
resistance against brainwashing.
In the later period, when the military decided to create priest-only 
camps, methods of resistance changed.92 In this case, the communists had 
to deal with a close-knit community sharing common values with members 
who were ready to support each other. Furthermore, they were members of 
the largest non-government organization able to confront the totalitarian 
state. That meant, among other things, that they at least had moral support 
from the Roman Catholic Church, whose head in Poland, Primate Stefan 
on behalf of those persecuted.93
During times when military service of priests served as sort of a pun-
ishment and was aimed at humiliation and physical torment, this esprit du 
corpse helped them to survive and maintain dignity.94 In the later period, 
the communists hoped to convert the clerics, force or convince them to 
renounce their faith, and to become political police informers. Clerics were 
force to attend lectures on Marxism-Leninism and the benefits of atheist 
philosophy.95 Since communist indoctrination often took a quasi-religious 
form, drafted students of theological seminaries found themselves in a posi-
89. Id. at 80–81.
90. Kieszek, supra note 11, at 224.
91. , supra note 48, at 327–28.
92. Id. at 329.
93. Id. This was true especially after Stalin’s death. In early Fifties, Primate Wyszynski was held 
prisoner by the communists. There was a series of pokazucha trials against high level priests accused of 
imaginary crimes, like espionage for Western powers, and an attempt to a communist controlled Patriot-
ic Catholic Church that almost destroyed the Catholic Church in Poland.
94. Fitych, supra note 50; see JAN JANKOWSKI, ALUMNI- : ELEMENTY FORMACJI 
SEMINARYJNEJ W ALUMNÓW- PODSTAWIE ANALIZY DOKUMENTÓW 
OSOBISTYCH (2007), http://digital.fides.org.pl/Content/515/bds-11a.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNR9-
D82F].
95. supra note 46, at 115.
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tion of missionaries debating religious issues with heathen priests of an 
atheist cult.96 This strategy of self-defense had not only helped to uphold 
young priests’ dignity, but also had an unexpected side effect. A report on 
indoctrination of clerics prepared by the political education department97 of 
the Polish People’s Army concluded that priests-in-training undergoing 
military training—supplemented by Marxist-Leninist indoctrination—came 
out not only spiritually stronger, but were prepared to rebut all potential 
arguments and to avoid political traps in their future careers as spiritual 
leaders.98
The problem of statutory dignity restoration of slave soldiers after the 
fall of communism in 1989 is a very good example of the complexities 
encountered by a government trying to right past wrongs. The main prob-
lem was that the existence of slave soldier battalions was not a well-known 
fact. Military orders were secret, and the official names of the military units 
were misleading. The orders suggested that the battalions were specialist 
military units like engineering corps or commissariat.99 Furthermore, for-
mer soldiers serving as forced laborers knew that they were in a Gulag100
because they were class enemies; thus, they were stigmatized. So many of 
them did not mention that fact even to close friends and relations,101 fearing
that the slave-soldier stigma could adversely influence their lives or the 
lives of their children. It took the former soldiers association102 about five 
years of campaigning before the public and the parliament noticed the 
problem. In 1994, an act addressing benefits for slave soldiers was passed, 
granting former soldiers of mining and construction battalions additional 
retirement benefits.103
96. Id. at 118. Yes, that is an oversimplification, although the quasi-religious character of Marx-
ism-Lenininsm has been discussed by political scientists. See, e.g., Anatoly Khazanov, Marxism-
Leninism as a Secular Religion, in THE SACRED TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF PROFESSOR STANLEY G. PAYNE 119 (Roger Griffin et al. eds., 2008).
97. Political education departments were responsible for communist indoctrination in the army 
and for identifying potential enemies within the ranks.
98. Mariusz Celmer, 
Latach 1965–1980: Zarys Problemu, 40 STUDIA P 289, 299 (2012); JANKOWSKI, supra note 94,
at 228.
99. BOSEK, supra note 18, at 79.
100. “Gulag” is an acronym for a Russian agency called Glavnoye upravleniye Lagerej (Main 
Camps Administration). This agency was responsible for running forced labor camps in the Soviet 
Union. The name is often used to do denote all forced labor camps in former Soviet Bloc.
101. As a matter of fact, one of the authors has learned that her father-in-law was a miner-soldier 
while doing research for this paper. It was not something anyone was willing to tell, and had it not been 
for our research, this part of Ewa’s family history would have been lost forever.
102.
103. , Ustawa z Dnia 2 Uprawnieniach 
ej Przymusowo Zatrudnianym w Kopalniach 
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Surprisingly, for a primarily Catholic country, no particular way of 
compensating priests-in-training for denigration and dignity takings during 
military service has been provided. There is no evidence as to why104 this is 
the case. There are, however, two possible explanations. One is that this 
form of dignity taking was only a small and relatively insignificant part of 
religious persecution in communist Poland. Another is that both the church 
and the state were more interested in righting property wrongs and return-
ing illegally nationalized church property than in healing dignity wounds of 
the clergy.
The self-defense of farmers against nationalization took many differ-
ent forms. Some farmers used passive resistance, some tried not to have 
contact with the state and its agendas. In a few cases, farmers tried armed 
resistance against collectivization.105 Civil disobedience was also a popular 
form of resistance. Farmers refused to deliver agricultural products to the 
state, traded illegally in land, or sold their products on black markets.
The resistance against collectivization was so strong that the govern-
ment had to abandon it. Only ten percent of the agricultural land was in 
possession of cooperatives and only twelve percent was managed by PGRs 
(state-owned farms). Both cooperatives and PGRs were economically inef-
fective and heavily subsidized. Ultimately, they were not able to achieve 
even pre-war levels of production of private farms.106
It should be noted that collectivization has also led to infantilization 
and denigration of employees. Farmers working for the state-owned farms 
formed a special sub-culture of paid workers stationed in remote villages, 
often with no contact with the outside world. Prone to communist propa-
ganda, yet being incapable of serving as model citizens of the communist 
state, they formed no strong social bonds, and had no loyalty towards their 
employers. They were working on state property, i.e., everybody’s proper-
ty, which translated easily into “nobody’s property.” They had no idea of 
accountability and almost no access to culture and education. Only vodka 
and moonshine were readily available in almost unlimited quantities. That 
, Batalionach Budowlanych, POLISH DIET (Sept. 2, 
1994), http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19941110537 [https://perma.cc/4LCE-FCKB].
104. To our knowledge, this issue has never been raised, neither by the press nor by the politicians. 
None of the acts granting compensation to victims of the communist persecution mentions priest-
soldiers or priests in general. 
105. Jarosz & Miernik, supra note 76, at 35.
106. ANTONI DUDEK & Z ZBLEWSKI, UTOPIA NAD W : HISTORIA PEERELU 102–03
(2008); ADOLF DOBIESZEWSKI, KOLEKTYWIZACJA WSI POLSKIEJ 1948–1956, at 54 (1993).
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explains the high crime rates and above-average level of alcoholism in the 
population of PGR and co-op workers.107
What was supposed to create a new, better type of human eventually 
led to creation of mindless puppets—able to follow orders but unable to 
take care of themselves, let alone become entrepreneurial. These people are 
probably one of two social groups strongly affected by the fall of com-
munism.108 They were unable to adapt, and unwilling to run the farms by 
themselves. They are now a stigmatized group, forming a natural ghetto 
and still, after twenty-five years, unable to get their dignity back.
V. CONCLUSION
The dignity takings in communist Poland took many different forms. 
This paper discussed only two forms, each having different effects and 
scope. It seems, however, that there are certain patterns common for all 
kinds of dignity takings. We can clearly see two different policies: one 
aimed at elimination of class enemies, and another aimed at converting 
them to communism. Some class enemies, like landowners or miner-
soldiers, were clearly considered unconvertable, so they were not only sec-
ond-class citizens, but also people who should cease to exist. In other cases, 
communists acted as “merciless missionaries” with a “convert or die” busi-
ness model. This was most clearly visible not only in the case of priest-
soldiers, but also in the case of collectivization, where the merciless mis-
sionary model was supplemented with other, more violent forms of persua-
sion. Of course, we are dealing only with a sample here—any 
generalization would require further studies.
In the case of both collectivization techniques and priest-soldiers, el-
ements of brainwashing were strongly evident.109 They were less noticea-
ble, although present, in the case of miner-soldiers who were not expected 
107. WOJCIECH ROSZKOWSKI, NAJNOWSZA HISTORIA POLSKI 1914–1945, at 243–47. This was 
characteristic also of other social and professional groups persecuted and indoctrinated in communist 




109. According to Alicja Grochowska, who researched brainwashing in the Holocaust, principal 
traits of brainwashing are injury to body and health, low level of security, diminishing of a good vision 
of self, feeling guilty, personality regression and offer of the new life. Alicja Grochowska, Holokaust
, 4 SAECULUM CHRISTIANUM 129, 129–30 (1997); ALICJA 
GROCHOWSKA, ELEMENTY PRANIA MÓZGU W PROCESIE Z YDÓW 59 (1996).
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to convert to communism. This could lead us to further research on dignity 
takings in Nazi-occupied Poland and its comparison with communism.110
At this point, it would be too early to speculate, and this subject would 
require further study. It seems, however, that brainwashing, torture, and 
persecution were common tools utilized to achieve a harmonious objective. 
Nazis either wanted their enemies dead or turned into obedient children—a
dehumanized people serving a master race. There was no option for con-
version. Communists, on the other hand, were not interested in creating 
subspecies of slave workers.
What is also noticeable is the relatively high level of defiance in both 
cases. In the case of collectivization, the resistance forced the government 
to stop the process. In the case of priest-soldiers, the number of priests-in-
training who dropped out of the seminary because of military propaganda 
was far lower than the number of clerics expelled from the seminaries by 
the Church itself for lacking progress in studies or being incapable of be-
coming priests.
This analysis confirms that dignity takings, both in their property-
related and in more general sense, are an inherent part of the communist 
system. The communist government—through an arbitrary set of criteria—
labelled some groups of people as sub-people that had to be eliminated by 
making them social outcasts or simply by killing them. This, in turn, made 
room for a new, imaginary, and “ideal” classless society. The rest of the 
society is subjected to a systemic expropriation leading to an infantilization 
of people who become like helpless children subjected to the will and mer-
cy of the state that monopolized the distribution of basic goods and ser-
vices.
110. Id. at 61. Alicja Grochowska’s methodology of brainwashing research could be used for this 
purpose, both as a tool for psychological and socio-legal studies. 
